F.F.4, Burma Frontier Force  

The raising of the mobile detachment, F.F.4 of the Burma Frontier Force was authorised in August 1941 and formation began during September.[1]

The composition of the unit was a headquarters section, one motorised infantry company (column) and three bicycle-mounted infantry columns.  A mortar platoon, with four 3-inch mortars, and a wireless section were also included.  The commanding officer was Major N.T. Loring[2] of the Reserve Battalion, Burma Frontier Force.  The Reserve Battalion also provided the first two companies to join, commanded by 2nd Lieutenant I.C.G. Scott[3] and 2nd Lieutenant I.H. Turner.[4]  Both companies had been raised and trained by Scott, beginning in September 1940.  He had at first been assisted by 2nd Lieutenant P.F. Taylor[5] who was soon transferred away, and replaced by 2nd Lieutenant Turner.  The detachment was later joined by two companies from the Bhamo Battalion, Burma Frontier Force.[6]  One of these, the Kachin company commanded by 2nd Lt. G.H.C. Peters,[7] initially formed part of F.F.1 until transfer to F.F.4.[8]

When fully formed, F.F.4 was organised as follows:

- Headquarters Section: C.O. Major N.T. Loring; Adjutant, 2nd Lt. L.G. Gaudie[9]
- No. 1 Infantry Company/Column (Motorised) : Kachins commanded by 2nd. Lt. G.H.C. Peters
- No. 2 Infantry Company/Column (Bicycle) : Punjabi Mussalmen commanded by 2nd Lt. Robert Cecil Fullarton[10]
- No. 3 Infantry Company/Column (Bicycle) : Punjabi Mussalmen commanded by 2nd Lt. I.C.G. Scott
- No. 4 Infantry Company/Column (Bicycle) : Sikhs commanded by 2nd Lt. I.H. Turner
- Mortar Platoon and the Wireless Section.[11]

Photograph of No.4 Bicycle Infantry Column, forming part of the Burma Frontier Force mobile detachment known as F.F.4, August 1941.  The location is most likely Pyawbwe, the depot for the Reserve Battalion, Burma Frontier Force and the location where F.F.4 began forming in August 1941. (Michael Turner)

In September 1941, Major Loring and 2nd Lt. Scott, together with Scott's company, established a camp at Loilem in the Shan states.  The rest of F.F.4 soon joined them there.  Having infantry companies dependent on bicycles for mobility was something of an experiment and at Loilem training was begun in how to ride them for few of the men knew how.  In October 1941, Scott was sent to reconnoitre F.F.4's planned operational area in the Mongpan-Mongton area.  He quickly discovered that the terrain in this area was not the most suitable for cyclists.  On 15th November 1941, Scott's No. 3 Column cycled to Mongpan, arriving two days later.  Most of the column went to Wantham but a section under Subedar Hussein Khan stayed at Loilem to continue building the camp.  At this time malaria was a major problem and many men went sick with it.[12]

F.F. Detachments in the Southern Shan States & Tenasserim-December 1941 (Indian Official History)

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In December 1941, the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade concentrated in the Taunggyi-Loilem areas prior to conducting training in the Southern Shan States.  F.F.4 came under the command of the brigade for training also.  This command arrangement was confirmed for operations following the declaration of war against Japan on 8th December.  The brigade ordered F.F.4 to Mongpan to garrison crossings over the Salween River and to send one column forward to the Monghta-Mong Hang-Mongton area.[13]  It was Scott's column that was selected to move forward and on 12th December 1941 the column was ordered to Mongton.  Scott set off on 15th December and en route prepared a defensive position at the crossing of the Salween River between Wan Ta Sang on the West and Wan Hsa La on the East.[14]

Towards the end of December, it was decided that Taunggyi should be evacuated by the 13th Indian Brigade.  The Brigade Commando unit was sent to Mongpan where it came under the command of F.F.4.[15]  Scott's column was attached to a Commando on 28th December.  The Commando was led by Captain Jenkins[16] and known as "Jecol Commando".  The combined force set off for Mong Hang on 1st January 1942.  Scott was forced to leave around 30 men behind due to sickness.  The force reached Mong Hang on 4th January however two days later it was ordered to form two smaller detachments.  Half of the force, under Scott, was sent to reconnoitre the area of Mong Kyawt and on to the Salween.  Jenkins' half of the force remained at Mong Hang but was soon ordered to the Toungoo front.  He and his men were replaced by No. 1 Column, F.F.4, the Kachins led by 2nd Lt. Peters.[17]

Major Loring and the advance party of No. 1 Column arrived with Scott at Mong Kyawt on 20th January.  Loring immediately ordered Scott to take a patrol into Thailand but gave orders that Scott was to seek information only and to avoid combat with the Thais.  However two days later a platoon from Scott's No. 3 Column under Havildar Talib Hussain ambushed a party of Thai police and soldiers at Namaklwe.  From then on F.F.4 mounted daily patrols to the border.  Peters' No. 1 Column arrived on 17th February and there were further clashes with Thai patrols three days later.  Elsewhere, Turner's No. 4 Company launched a minor attack in the Mongshat area.  With two platoons and a Commando section, he attacked the Thais on the border and inflicted around 30 casualties for the loss of one man wounded.[18]

By now the Chinese had begun arriving in the area, relieving the British of responsibility for the defence of the Shan States.  F.F.4 was ordered to hand over to the Chinese and move to Mongton.  The main body of F.F.4 left for Mongton on 21st February, leaving Scott to complete the hand over to the Chinese, which he did by 24th February.  From Mongton F.F.4 began to withdraw to Mongpan on 25th February, via Wan Hsa La, arriving on 1st March.  By 8th March F.F.4 was at Monghang where they boarded lorries for the journey to Pyu where the detachment came under the command of the 1st Burma Infantry Division.  Two days later they had reached Pyawbwe and arrived at Toungoo the next day.[19]

1st Burma Division at Pyuntaza (War Diary WO 172/447)

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The 1st Burma Infantry Division gave orders for F.F.4 to act as flank guard on the Division's right flank for the attack on Pyuntaza, beginning on 11th March.  Scott's No. 3 Column was detached to move further South with orders to form a roadblock on the main road between Pyuntaza and Pegu should the main attack on Pyuntaza succeed.  The attack did not succeed and Scott and his men fell back to a rendezvous point hoping to rejoin the main body of F.F.4.  On reaching the rendezvous they found that F.F.4 had gone, as part of the planned withdrawal of the 1st Burma Division.  F.F.4 was now under the command of the 1st Burma Brigade.  As part of the general withdrawal order for the night of 13th/14th March, the detachment, less Scott, was to move from the area of Nyuaunglebin to Mogyaung.[20]

On 15th March, F.F.4, less Scott's Column, was placed under the command of the 2nd Burma Brigade.  It is possible that this was also the date that Lieutenant Turner's No. 4 Column was detached from F.F.4 to come under the direct command of the 1st Burma Infantry Division as divisional troops, acting as a guard unit for the divisional headquarters.  That day the brigade, consisting of only the 2nd Battalion, The Burma Rifles, the 2nd Mountain Battery and F.F.4, issued orders for the protection of flank of the 1st Burma Brigade.  As part of the preparatory moves, F.F.4 was ordered to the vicinity of Daingtaya.  Should the Japanese advance any counter attack was to be undertaken by the 2nd Burma Rifles whilst F.F.4 formed a "southern defensive flank".[21]

Meanwhile Scott, moving by night, continued his own withdrawal and finally joined up with F.F.4 on 17th March.  That day, Major Loring received a message from the 1st Burma Infantry Division that F.F.4 was falling behind.  Loring gave orders that if F.F.4 became separated the men were to rendezvous at a point to the West of Toungoo.  Loring attached his Headquarters to the lead column, No.2 Column under 2nd Lt. Fullarton.  Scott's No. 3 column was to provide the detachment rearguard.  F.F.4 set off at 14;00 on 17th March, in terrible heat, with most of the marching undertaken in the relative cool of the night.[22]

Operations in the Shan States (Indian Official History)

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At dawn on 19th March, F.F.4 set off once more, heading for a village on the Pyu Chaung, it being believed that the 1st Burma Infantry Division was holding the line of the chaung itself.  The detachment halted at noon hoping to make contact with the 1st Burma Infantry Division however none was made so they set off on the march once again.  By 17:00 that same day, the detachment was only a few miles from its objective.  Major Loring was at the head with Fullarton's No. 2 Column, followed by the No. 2 Column mules.  Next in line was Peters' No. 1 Column of Kachins, followed by their mules, followed in turn by the Headquarters section and their mule transport.  At the rear of the line was Scott's No. 3 Column - about one mile to the rear of Loring.  The head of the detachment's column was about level with the village of Obogon on the right, with the edge of the Pegu Yomas on the left.  Suddenly heavy firing broke out from Obogon village, firstly mortars and then machine gun and rifle fire.  The fire was mostly directed at No. 2 column at the front.  All the mules from each column stampeded in turn back through the long line of the detachment, arriving to crash through No.3 Column like a cavalry charge.  Scott sent a platoon forward to the North-east corner of a village to the right of his column.  This platoon pressed through the village to the North and on reaching the village edge brought Obogon under fire.  A runner arrived from Loring arrived with Scott, with a message for Scott to send up a 3-inch mortar.  He could not immediately comply with this for he was busy collecting the startled mules in a copse to the South-East on the edge of the Pegu Yomas.  Scott did manage to send a runner to Peters telling him to liaise with Fullarton while Scott finished collecting the mules.  By 18:30 most the mules had been collected so Scott went forward to meet Peters.  Peters had lost contact with Fullarton who had taken cover in the jungle to the West, having taken heavy casualties.  At this point, Scott received word that the Japanese were now advancing from behind F.F.4.  Scott ordered a rapid withdrawal for his and Peters' Columns, westwards into the Pegu Yomas via the copse where the mules were being organised.[23]

By the next morning, 20th March, Scott and Peters were in the jungle, seeking a path to the North.  However they had neither map nor compass and all usable paths seemed to run East to West.  At a halt they contacted the 1st Burma Infantry Division and although their message was acknowledged no orders were forthcoming.  That evening Peters' Column set off on its own, having gone before Scott realised.  He was now left with 60-70 men of his own Column, 40 of Fullarton's, 60 of the Headquarters Section and 40-50 Chinese mule drivers.  Finally a message arrived from the 1st Burma Division.  The division was aware of the ambush and had assumed that the attackers might have been Chinese.  Scott was now instructed to save what he could and withdraw as fast as possible to the West of Toungoo.  Assuming that to travel light would be fastest and safest, the mules were now set free and everything that could not be carried, including the mortars, was destroyed as much as possible.  A single wireless set was retained.  Scott and his men set off at 19:00 that evening.[24]

At first light the next day, after a brief rest, they set off again.  It was terribly hot and they were short of water.  Many of the men were sick.  The Pyu Chaung was reached the following day and on the next, 22nd March, the difficult crossing of the chaung was made.  Having set off once more on the 2nd March, Scott and his men encountered a friendly village where food was obtained and eaten gratefully.  That night food was again obtained from a second village that also provided a guide to see Scott on his way the next morning.  By the night of 25th/26th March Scott estimated that they were about 12-15 miles to the North of Toungoo.  The next day, after a short march, a halt was called for by now everyone was exhausted.  They moved off again later and were fed by more friendly villagers.  At around noon on 27th March they reached the main North-South road and eventually an empty Chinese truck returning from Toungoo.  All the men were loaded into the transport which took them on to Pyinmana where they arrived that night.  From here Scott and the men under his command were taken on to Meiktila.  On 29th March Scott's Column was listed as under the command of the 13th Indian Infantry Brigade at Meiktila. 

The 1st Burma Division, by now in the Allanmyo area, also listed F.F.4, less Scott's Column, as Divisional Troops.  Presumably this refers to Turner's Column which had been acting as headquarters defence troops from some time.[25]

At Meiktila Scott found that Peters had arrived there three days earlier, with only 40 of his men, the rest having deserted.[26]  At the time of F.F.4's troubles on the Toungoo front another detachment, F.F.1, was making its way on foot across the Pegu Yomas to the Irrawaddy front.  In his account of the operations of F.F.1, the Commanding Officer, Major W.R.V. Russell,[27] recalls that his force was joined by about 200 stragglers, mostly Kachins and Punjabi Mussalmen from F.F.4 and a few Gurkhas from a Gurkha regiment.  The stragglers were formed into a third column by F.F.1.  The men were described as being shaken and demoralised and deemed unreliable.  They also imposed a great drain on the dwindling food supplies.  It is probable that these F.F.4 "stragglers" were Peters' Column.  F.F.1 and the men from F.F.4 succeeded in crossing the Pegu Yomas and on 2nd April sent a message to the 1st Burma Infantry Division that they had done so and were now at Paukkaung.[28]

It was at Meiktila that Scott found out what had become of Major Loring and 2nd Lt. Fullarton from the company cook of No.2 Column.  After coming under fire on 19th March Loring, Fullarton and around 40-50 men of No. 2 Column withdrew into the jungle.  Here they stayed for a while before heading deeper into the jungle when they were again attacked by the Japanese.  They headed North, marching for around a few days before turning East.  Unfortunately they were all captured when they encountered a party of Japanese, the cook managing to get away.  After the war, Loring said that when first seen he had thought he had run into a party of Chinese but discovered too late that they were in fact Japanese.[29]

On 31st March, a column of F.F.4, presumably No.4 Column belonging to Turner, was at Dayindabo working with F.F.1 and was placed under the command of the 1st Burma Brigade.  This arrangement continued up until at least 3rd April.  There then followed the withdrawal of the 17th Indian Infantry Division from Prome through the area held by the 1st Burma Infantry Division around Allanmyo, Thayetmyo and Dayindabo.  It seems that Turner's Column was sent back to Meiktila around this time.[30]  Turner's No. 4 Column now joined Scott at Meiktila.  However Turner had been evacuated sick and this now left Scott as the senior officer of F.F.4 and he was made Commanding Officer and promoted to Major.  After about a week at Meiktila F.F.4 moved to Yenangyaung where the unit became part of the Burma Frontier Force depot there and ceased to exist in its original form.[31]

The higher command had decided to reorganise the F.F.s to break up the “big” F.Fs and make them into smaller mobile units of two companies each and to create a separate force of Mounted Infantry by amalgamating the surviving mounted elements.[32]  Orders to this effect had been issued on 3rd April.[33]  It was decided to carry out the reorganisation at Yenangyaung which had recently become the Advanced Headquarters of the Inspector General of the Burma Frontier Force, having been relocated there from Pyawbwe in February, the Rear Headquarters moving to Myitkyina.  At Yenangyaung the Inspector General, Brigadier Roughton,[34] combined these duties with that of the Commander, Central Area, responsible for maintaining and protecting the lines of communication.[35]  By April Yenangyaung was also home to a draft of B.F.F. reinforcements.  F.F.1., F.F.3., and F.F.4. were concentrated in the scrub along the North of Pin Chaung and reorganisation and re-equipping began around 4th or 5th April 1942.[36]

Major Russell was appointed Commander Frontier Force (C.F.F.) to the 1st Burma Division, a role similar to that which Major Mostert had been performing and would continue to do so for the 17th Indian Division.  There were insufficient personnel and the resulting newly reorganised infantry columns were somewhat below the planned establishment.  All were re-equipped except for wireless equipment by the morning of 16th April.[37]  Both the original F.F.1 and F.F.3 were made into a new F.F.1 and a new F.F.3 of two companies of Gurkhas each.[38] 

The Kachin Column from the original F.F.1 joined with its Kachin counterpart from F.F.4 to form a new F.F.4.[39]  This new F.F.4 was commanded by Captain E.G. Forbes,[40] who had been a column commander in F.F.1.[41]  Lieutenant P.L. Hope,[42] formerly the column commander of No.2 Column, F.F.3, was appointed Adjutant and Quartermaster.  It seems F.F.4 was never fully formed and in Major J.H. Turner's[43] account of the fighting that ensued shortly North of the Pin Chaung, the unit is referred to as "F.F.4. (less 1 column)".[44]  Captain Scott retained command of Turner's Sikh Column and after a certain amount of re-equipping moved to Mount Popa on or around 15th April.  There a column of Kumaonis from the original F.F.3 was added to his command which was now known as F.F.9.[45]

Meanwhile the Allanmyo-Thayetmyo area had been given up on the night of 5th/6th April and by 8th April the 1st Burma Infantry Division was holding the Western portion of the Burcorps line running from Minhla on the Irrawaddy out eastwards to Taungdwingyi.  From 11th April the Japanese attacked these positions, driving Burcorps back, and by 14th April the 1st Burma Infantry Division was holding the line of the Yin Chaung.  However this line was given up in turn when a general withdrawal to Yenangyaung began on 16th April.

Sometime on or just before 16th April, the newly formed mobile detachments, F.F.1, F.F.3 and F.F.4, moved back to the North of the Pin Chaung where they were camped prior to being sent out as an information screen.  By now the 1st Burma Infantry Division had withdrawn from the Magwe area to Yenangyaung, South of the Pin Chaung.[46]  It was then that a new threat to the 1st Burma Infantry Division emerged.  What follows is described by Lt. Colonel G.G. Pryce (Commander Corps, Burma Frontier Force, attached to Headquarters, 1st Burma Corps):[47]

F.F. Detachments at the Pin Chaung 16/17th April 1942

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“In the evening of 16th April when at _________ (I forget the name of the place but the road goes right to Kyaukpadaung and a left branch goes to Chauk [the village is Gwegyo]), I was ordered to detail two F.Fs. to proceed to the two tracks between the two routes MAGWE – YENANGYAUNG, TAUNGDWINGYI – NATMAUK along which 1 Burdiv and 17 Div respectively were withdrawing.  I proceeded there and gave orders to the Os.C. [Officers Commanding] F.F.1 & F.F.3 (Majors D.R. Turner[48] and J.H. Turner).  I was about to return to Corps H.Qrs about 2030 hours but stopped to speak to Capt. Forbes. A station wagon passed me proceeding in the direction of the village where the Kyaukpadaung and Chauk roads fork. When it reached a point about 500 yards ahead, just before the rise in the ground, a sudden burst of L.A. [light automatic] fire was heard and the station wagon burst into flames.  F.F. Commanders were called and ordered to arrange local protection while proceeding with their preparations to move as ordered.  Shortly afterwards the driver of the station wagon came in and reported that the fire had come from the East of the road.  Several vehicles from the North then came through unmolested.   About this time 2 Bn. R. Tanks Corps [2nd Royal Tank Regiment] arrived.  The officer commanding was given all information and stated that he proposed to push on, so I ordered F.Fs. 1 & 3 to be prepared to follow the Tanks.  The first tank went up the road and when opposite the burning station wagon, one of its tracks was blown off by a grenade or mine and the road was blocked.  O.C. 2nd Bn. R.T.C. [2nd Royal Tank Regiment] then decided to remain for the night or until the road was clear, sent a tank up near the disabled tank, ordered the crew of the latter to evacuate their tank as soon as covering fire was opened by the 2nd tank.  This was done successfully and the crew were evacuated safely. Shortly afterwards the tank was set alight by the enemy.

I then ordered F.F.4. to sweep the area E of the road and they moved off about 2330 hours. Throughout the night there were a number of bursts of L.A. fire and the noise of crackers etc., but it was obvious that no contact was made.  I therefore decided to put a sweep through on both sides of the road, starting just before dawn. F.F.1. was detailed.  At first no opposition was encountered.  At about dawn heavy fire was heard and F.F.4 was later seen withdrawing on the EAST of the road and suffered considerable casualties.  F.F.1 was then held up on the East of the road but advanced on WEST of the road for a time, when this flank was also held up by fire further to the West.  One Pl. F.F.3 was then despatched to deal with this enemy post and receiving valuable aid from a section of tanks, were able to overcome the opposition and the advance continued.  The right flank was still held up and the tanks were unable to help.  I went to this flank and was able to get a small party of about 1 section forward to within 50 yards of the high ground occupied by the enemy.  About ½ of the section became casualties and further progress was impossible owing to the enfilade fire of a L.A. further to the East.  By this time those on the West of the road had advanced and were about level with the party on the East of the road.  I proceeded over to them, decided to put in an attack on the high ground on the EAST of the road from the West, and went back to arrange for co-operation with the Tanks.  The O.C. Tank Bn., put one tp. at my disposal to support the attack.  One A.A. [anti-aircraft] gun also came into action and engaged the enemy position.  The attack went in and the enemy evacuated the position and withdrew to the East. Having proceeded about 300 yards to the EAST of the road a position was occupied under heavy S.A.A. and Mortar fire.  The Tanks and a good deal of the transport which had been piling up all night went through.  The enemy then infiltrated round our flanks and got back to the road preventing any further movement along the road and also taking us in the rear.  “A” Company of the KOYLI [King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry] who were on the far side of the road block had occupied the highest ground astride the road further to the North and we withdrew on them.  On our departure a flight of about 12 Japanese bombers bombed what transport remained in PINCHAUNG [sic]."[49]

The 1st Burma Infantry Division eventually escaped across the Pin Chaung on the afternoon of 19th April, having had to abandon most of its motor transport.

F.F.4 was almost destroyed at the Pin Chaung and set off North for Myitkyina but never reached there.  On the way the men were paid off at the railway junction town of Naba on the Western side of the Irrawaddy near Katha, the Kachins being allowed to return to their homes.[50]

22 November 2017