Attack on Winkadat – 1st Battalion, The Burma Regiment - May 1945

[Commanding Officer’s Appreciation]

Information – Enemy

Since arrival this area constant local reports have been received of a concentration of Japs in area WINKADAT 3006. The strength was variously estimated at 1000, 500, 700, 400.

On the 19 May questioning of a local considered fairly reliable gave a str. Of 400 Japs in WINKADAT with 2 mortars, type unknown. Positions taken up in the village were mainly around Kg area N.E corner. In this area there is a tank, where both mortars and 4 LMGs were mounted. There were about 100 Japs in this area alone. A police post with a mortar was maintained in the houses sq. 3107, consisting of mortar crew and 8 men who were changed daily.

A patrol to the NORTH bank of the CHAUNG could see Japs at WINKADAT and directed arty shoot.

On 20 May a local rep was received that bulk of Japs had marched SOUTH during the night and are now at KYIBINZU. Only about 60 left who are concentrated in Kg. area EAST side.

A patrol sent out to observe results of air strike on this area at 1000 hrs 20 May. 9 Japs ran EAST towards ALOK 3208, 13 ran WEST towards KYWESAGYET 2906. After strike some movement seen area NE Kg. WINKADAT and noise at exploding ammunition heard.

On the 20/21 May patrols sent during night to recce a crossing place reported the water at the WEST end 2707 about waist deep, at the EAST end 3007 over 6ft.

A recce patrol send (sic) across in the WEST reported JAP post of 4 men established in KALAZU 2706 and that patrols move EAST and WEST along the SOUTH bank of CHAUNG.

OWN TROOPS – 1 BURMA plus supporting arms.

INTENTION.- (i) to ascertain the strength and disposition of the enemy in WINKADAT. (ii) to destroy those enemy by (a) night (b) day.

NOTES

1. Folding boats can be made available.

2. Bullock carts are available.

3. It may not be possible to alter present dispositions except to a small extent.

4. Arty is available as for own recent ops.

5. Air strike might be arranged by day.

6. Any further recces which may be required can be carried out. I.O. must be informed.



REQUIRED – As Comd. 1 Burma, appreciation and plan by 1600 hrs 21 May.

Syndicates:-

1. A Coy officers & GCOs

2. B Coy officers & G.C.Os, HQ Comd. And T.O.

3. C Coy officers & G.C.Os, Adjt & I.O.



Field. A.S. Lewis. Lt-Col Comd. 1 Burma Regt.

21 May 45 – 0900 hrs

SECRET WINKADAT OPERATION No 1 Syndicate  [‘A’ Company]

Appreciation 

Ground: Open paddy field or mud without cover for infantry. Villages thickly grown providing excellent cover for defence surrounded by open fields of fire easily covered with a minimum of weapons. To reach position, crossing of river by boat or foot to be carried out. Very great advantage to defence, none to the attack.

Space: Distance of objective from present positions too great for operation and return to be carried out on foot in one day.

Time: Owing to transport difficulties operation and withdrawal to be carried out within 24 hours, as it will not be possible to supply troops in occupation of the objective.

Weather: Further rain is anticipated but would not make the situation worse, as only bullock carts can be used forward of TAWGYI. Moonlight is nearing the full and lasts nearly all night, but may be obscured by rain clouds. State of tides not known but assumption is that it does not affect materially the crossings already recced.

Enemy: Intentions in area not known. May be presumed to be present in some strength in KYAUNGWA, KYIBINZU & THANATTAN*. Dispositions along river bank prevent surprise in crossing of river by day or night, except perhaps from SHANGAING area. It is assumed until receipt of further information that this crossing is not practicable. Enemy has shown a disposition to retire from a position isolated by troops, air-strafed & shelled, if the threat is sufficiently over-whelming. On the other hand, dummy “abandon ship” parties have been used during air strikes while a main force remains in the position, determined to fight it out. *From which directions counter attacks may be launched.

Own Troops: Will be required in sufficient force to advance on broad but strong front in approach to village, and from different directions. Village fighting also demands large reserves. Supporting fire must be heavy and immediate to call.

Conclusion: Preliminary concentration of forces will be required in ZIBYUGON & KYONYE. Crossing of river to be carried out without opposition, only possible in area SQ 2707 or SHANGAING. Approach to village to be done at night. It is essential to seize a foothold in the village attacked at all costs, from which cover can be obtained for subsequent attacks and evacuation of casualties. The use of the crossing by boats in SQ 3108 can only be contemplated after the clearing of WINKADAT, when it would provide the main L of C. Clearing of the village to be done in daylight. Subsequent withdrawal across boat crossing. Evacuation of casualties very long and slow business.

An airstrike preliminary might have the effect of reducing the enemy garrison by evacuation, to the extent of possible complete evacuation. Generally, (i) the attack might be dodged by the enemy, the result of the operation being occupation and then evacuation of an empty village. (ii) or the enemy may remain to resist the attack, the result of the operation may then be (a), clearing of the village in close fighting, involving elimination of the enemy garrison at the expense of many infantry casualties or (b) failure to gain foothold in the village, involving withdrawal with casualties over the country to the original crossing, and possible exposure to counter attack from the south making withdrawal across the river very difficult.

Plan

1st Phase: Concentration of 1 Burma on bullock cart basis with 1 Coy at KYONYE and remainder ZIBYUGON, by 1100 hrs D-1. Rest during day. Assault boats brought up during day. Airstrike on WINKADAT at 1600 hrs, followed by artillery concentration for 10 minutes on same place foe 10 minutes.

2nd Phase: 3 Coys cross at SQ2707 at 2000 and occupy KALAZU. Harassing fire normal during night on WINKADAT & KYWESAGYET up to 0300 hrs, on WINKADAT up to 0400 hrs, D Day.

3rd Phase: 1 Coy & mortar platoon to area 305 085 at 0400 hrs with assault boats.

3 Coys advance from KALAZU, occupy KYWESAGYET and advance and occupy South WINKADAT from SOUTH. No movement before 0300 hrs, South WINKADAT to be occupied by 0500 hrs. South WINKADAT being all village South of E.W. Grid Line 068.

4th Phase: Clearing of village WINKADAT, commencing at 0515 hrs with artillery support on call, and mortar support.

5th Phase: Withdrawal from WINKADAT to ZIBYUGON via crossing SQ3108 using folding boats, covered by Coy at 305 085. To be completed by 1700 hrs D Day. No Coy at KYONYE night D/ D+1.

Admin: F.S.M.O. with packs. 1 day’s (light Scale) rations to be carried on man. Coy reserve ammunition to move with Mortar Platoon. RAP with Mortar Platoon. All kit? On bullock carts.

Intercom: 2 FOOs with attacking Coys & Mortar Officer, all with w/t. 48 sets all Coys & Mortar Platoon. Tac HQ with attacking Coys, Main H.Q. with Mortar Platoon. Line to ZIBGUYON & Main HQ.


AJT 1 Burma. H.M. Gray. O.C. ‘A’ Coy.

SECRET 

Appreciation of the situation by the “B” Coy Syndicate. Pannyo. 21.5.45     [‘B’ Company]

Ref. Map BURMA 94/C15.

1. Object 

To ascertain the strength and dispositions and destroy the enemy in WINKADAT.

2. Factors

(a) Enemy strength

Local reports have varied between 1000 and 60 Japs occupying the village WINKADAT. The latest local information received morning 21.5.45 was 60. A post is known to have been established in the houses SOUTH bank of the river. sq. 3107.

From local reports the areas Kg. on the EAST appears to be a strongpoint.

Both KYWESAGYET and ALOK are apparently occupied.

Own strength

One Coy is involved occupying ZIBYGON which leaves the rifle coys, Pl. M.M.Gs and Bn 3’ Mortars. In support Fld Regt., Bty 3.7s (will have to move if to be used), Air support.

(b) Ground 

Suitable for infantry on foot and bullock carts. Providing NO rain, Jeeps and tanks, with some difficulty. may approach to the river bank. Route recce will be essential if jeeps and tanks are to be used.

The river presents the main obstacle and tides will have to be considered.

(c) Time

Day-light from 0500 hrs to 1900 hrs approx. otherwise does not affect the issue.

Space

Nearest held position by own troops 3000yds from WINKADAT

(d) Weather

Monsoons about to break – probable rain

(e) Moonlight from 1800 hrs to mid-night but clouds may obscure.

(f) Commn.

Line laid to ZIBYUGON. Wireless good. L. of C. by bullock carts and jeep tracks.

3. Courses.

(i) For the approach to be made from the EAST depends on crossing of the chaungs SOUTH of SHANGAING and a further crossing of the chaung EAST of ALOK being possible. The village of ALOK will have to be taken first so losing possibly surprise.

(ii) The approach from the WEST is shorter but the villages KALAZU and KYWESAGYET will have to be mopped up enroute causing delay. The capture of KYWESAGYET would cut off the enemy and prevent their escape to the SOUTH and if KYSAGIT was held one may presume that WINKADAT would be untenable.

(iii) To attack from the NORTH is the shortest possible route and the best ground. It would be possible to carry boats to the river bank (or use bullock carts). There are no preliminary objectives apart from establishing a bridge-head.

(iv) An attack from the WEST and the NORTH appears to be the best course providing more infantry can be placed under comd. Failing this, to attack from the NORTH.

Owing to the very open nature of the ground a pure daylight crossing would prove costly. An attack by night would entail the loss of close Arty. support and air-strike. Therefore the establishing of the bridge-head before first light and the completion of the operation by day light would enable the greater part of the approach to be made at night and still have the support of Arty. and Air. for the actual destruction of the enemy in WINKADAT.

4. PLAN 

To concentrate at ZIBYUGON on the evening prior to the attack. One platoon to form a bridge head at 305075 by first light supported by mortars from NORTH bank if necessary. Two Coys to attack from NORTH. If tanks are able to reach NORTH bank to be employed neutralising KYWESAGYET.

(One Coy to clear WEST of track and excl track. One Coy EAST incl. tracks that run NORTH to SOUTH.

Fire plan.

H.E. during river crossing on WINKADAT (ARTY).

At first light plus 60 minutes, air strike.

Fire as directed by F.O.O.S. with both assaulting coys.

In the event of trouble from KYWESAGYET anticipated – smoke screen by Fld. Arty.

‘C’ Syndicate. 1st Burma Regiment  [‘C’ Company]

Appreciation

Object: To ascertain strength of enemy in area WINKADAT and his disposition.

Objective: To destroy enemy in WINKADAT

Factors affecting

(i) Enemy. 

Strengths unknown, although local reports state 60 Japs dig in temple area. His intentions are unknown & part of the object of the exercise is to discover his intentions. More detailed recces needed to ascertain strengths and dispositions.

(ii) Our Troops.

2 Coy with Regt 25 pdrs at call plus air strikes.

Troops available source insufficient - due to necessity holding the Battalion area. Either someone to take over Battalion area – or additional troops from 3/2nd Punjab.

(iii) Ground.

Open, flat, marshy with a river obstacle running across the front from West to East. Many river channels intersperse the area. Map unreliable as to tracks and river channels.

Day approach impossible owing to easy Japanese observation. Night approach over this country will be difficult, but possible. Recces of routes needed. River obstacle must be thoroughly recced for state of banks, width, depth and rate of flow. High Water must be known.

Time & Space 

Area is large and it is estimated 3 ½ hours needed to transport boats and prepare them at the river for the crossing. Roughly 9½ hours of darkness – so should be possible to cross at High Water. Owing to ill-defined trenches evacuation of casualties and supply of ammunition would be very difficult.

Other Factors

Morale. Enemy: Low. Own Troops:  Not high owing to repeated promises of increased rations and Leave not being fulfilled.

Weather.

Deteriorating rapidly, usually with rain at night. Moon ¾ full. Must be done quickly or area will be impassable.

Courses Open 

(i) Detailed recces & then Arty & airstrikes on observed positions. (ii) Attack the village of WINKADAT.

The first course seems the more practical, but if the second is deemed advisable by higher command then outline plan as follows:-

(1) Night Attack

(2) One Coy assault with one Coy in immediate reserve astride river crossing place.

(3) River crossing at sufficient distance from enemy to ensure surprise and an unopposed crossing. Exact place dependent on recces, to this effect.

(4) No Arty – surprise, but with F.O.O in the forward Company. He will have Regt at call.

To the Adjt

Above find the appreciation and outline plan of C Coy syndicate.

Signed T.G.B. Howe. Major. 12.50 Hrs, 21 May ’45.