The Burma Campaign

6th Burma Rifles

The Battalion was raised for the new Burma Army during late 1947 from former officers and men of the Patriotic Burma Forces.  It is probable that officers and men of the short lived 1st Field Regiment, Burma Artillery were posted to the new battalion when the field regiment was disbanded.[1]  At independence on 4th January 1948, the 6th Burma Rifles was located at Pegu.[2]

Communist Insurgency

Following independence one of the largest anti-government factions was the Communists, of which the major grouping was the Communist Party of Burma (C.P.B.), sometimes known as the “White Flag Communists”.  Discontent among the C.P.B. grew into armed struggle between themselves and government forces and by May 1948 pitched battles were being fought.  On 15th June 1948, twenty-one privates of the 1st Burma Rifles at Wa in the Pegu District defected to the C.P.B.  In nearby Abya Buda, 31 soldiers shot their officer before also going over to the Communists.  The following day more troops of the 1st Burma Rifles defected and went underground, as did elements of the 6th Burma Rifles.  A large area around Waw, Daik-U and Thantabin in Central Burma was quickly taken under Communist control. 

There were further, major defections to the insurgent cause in August 1948.  The 1st and part of the 3rd Burma Rifles deserted to the insurgents on 9th and 10th August.  The 1st Burma Rifles were led by Lt. Colonel Zeyya, formerly a Staff Officer at the War Officer and military Designate, London, and Major Sien Tin, the battalion second in command.  Zeyya attempted to persuade the 6th Burma Burma Rifles to join the insurgency and having failed in this then contacted General Ne Win, offering to stop the fighting and to unit the White and Yellow factions of the P.V.O. and the Communists in a common front against the Karens.  The 4th, 5th and 6th Burma Rifles were found to be unwilling to fight and suffered a trickle of deserters.  They were kept in being on the government side by being posted to garrison duties away from the contested areas.  The 6th Burma Rifles remained in the Pegu District.[3]

Following defeats on the outskirts of Rangoon and at Prome in August 1948, the survivors of the Burma Rifles defectors formed the Revolutionary Burma Army and went underground.  At this time the 6th Burma Rifles was commanded by Lt. Colonel Tin U.[4] 

The Karen Conflict

In early 1949 communal tensions boiled over with a series of events that inflamed the situation between the Karens and the Burmans.  Towards the end of January, militiamen of the Karen National Defence Organisation (K.N.D.O.) took over Insein, forming the north western part of Rangoon, and the surrounding area.  On 1st February the government sent troops to deal with this and opened fire on the town before clashing with K.N.D.O. militia.  The fighting continued for weeks and spread to other parts of the country.  The town of Toungoo was taken over by the K.N.D.O. and the 1st Karen Rifles and the 1st Kachin Rifles were sent to retake the town.  However on 27th January the 1st Karen Rifles, went over to the Karen insurgents, and were followed by the 1st Kachin Rifles on 16th February.[5]

The Karen Conflict: The Siege of Thazi

Towards the end of 1948 two companies of the 6th Burma Rifles had been sent to the Meiktila area to relieve the Chin Hills Battalion (which in the first half of 1949 was redesignated as the 3rd Chin Rifles).  These two companies were subsequently ordered to Loikaw.  When the Chin battalion was ordered to Karenni State to restore law and order by peaceful means, in early January 1949 it sent two companies to Loikaw where they joined up with the two companies of the 6th Burma Rifles.  The combined force then operated under the name "SONFORCE". However the Karen conflict was by now in full swing.  A joint force of the Communist Party of Burma (C.P.B.) and the K.N.D.O., including members of the 1st Karen and the 1st Kachin Rifles, captured Meiktila on 20th February, together with the commanding officer of the Chin battalion and a number of his officers.  The insurgents then went on to take Mandalay, Myitnge and Kume on 12th and 13th March.

On 8th March 1949 the strength and location of the 6th Burma Rifles was reported as:[6]

- Battalion headquarters:   Pegu

- Two platoons:   Thazi

- One platoon:  Meiktila

- One platoon:   Daik-U

- One platoon:   Pegu Town.

"SONFORCE", made up of elements of the Chin Hills Battalion (at sometime in 1949 redesignated as the 3rd Chin Rifles), two companies of the 6th Burma Rifles and a company of Gurkhas from the 4th Battalion, The Burma Regiment, was ordered to Thazi where it subsequently became besieged by the K.N.D.O.  After withstanding all assaults over the period of a month or so, the siege was eventually lifted when the Karens withdrew on 8th April, allowing "SONFORCE" to reoccupy Meiktila on the same day.[7]

An account of the struggle of Thazi was written by the then second in command of the 6th Burma Rifles, Major Myat Htan who at the start of this story was with Battalion Headquarters at Pegu when he was ordered to Meiktila:

"At the beginning of 1949 I was sent to Meiktila to run two of our companies [6th Burma Rifles] sent there a few months before to replace the 3rd Chin Rifles which was running field operations in the Loikaw area of the Kayah Land.  When I got there the companies from my 6th Burma Rifles were no longer in Meiktila.  They were in Loikaw instead by the orders of Northern Command.

Meiktila had no government forces except a battalion of Sitwundan [a territorial force of local militia raised hurriedly] led by young Captain Tint Swe (who became a general and the Minister for Industry during Ne Win’s long rule). They were surrounded by massive Karen forces.  Pakoku, Mandalay, and Toungoo were all occupied by the Karen Rifles and the Karen Union Military Police (U.M.P.) battalions.[8]  The Rangoon-Mandalay rail line was also controlled by armed Karen units.  I finally set out to join my two companies at Loikaw, [where they were based] together with Third Chin Rifles.

On 27th January 1949 the 1st Karen Rifles took over Toungoo and on 4th February the 2nd Karen Rifles occupied Prome.  Both Karen battalions then marched south towards Rangoon to meet up with K.N.D.O. forces in Insein.  But both Karen battalions were repelled and almost destroyed on their way by the Burma Rifles waiting for them.

I was ordered to search for my two companies which had last been seen at Kalaw where they had made their most recent radio contact.  I flew there and found out they had left Kalaw for Thazi.  So I got a car and followed them alone.  When I reached Yinmabin near Thazi I was told that my troops were digging in at Thazi and clashing daily with the Karens now entrenched at Meiktila. 

I reached Thazi and discovered not only my two companies from 6th Burma Rifles but also the two companies of the 3rd Chin Rifles [the Chin Hills Battalion] there. They all were originally heading for Meiktila as ordered but were stranded in Thazi when Meiktila fell into Karen hands just ten days before they reached Thazi. From that day they had dug in there and been bombarded by enemy mortars every single day.

Now I had two companies of the 6th Burma Rifles, two companies of the 3rd Chin Rifles and one company of Gurkhas from the 4th Battalion, The Burma Regiment; altogether being five companies with which to hold Thazi. The whole town was deserted and totally destroyed.  The troops were in the bunkers placed tightly on the semi circle from the east around the south to the west on the town edge facing towards Meiktila."[9]

Major Myat Htan, his 6th Burma Rifles and the 3rd Chin Rifles stood their ground at Thazi and successfully fought off a superior force of Karens and Kachins[10]

Reinforcements were sent to restore the situation at Meiktila but they arrived too late to prevent the encirclement of Thazi.  After the fall of Mandalay on 13th March, Major Khen Za Moong of the 2nd Chin Rifles flew to Rangoon.  There he was asked by General Ne Win to go to Thazi and take command of "SONFORCE", including the two companies of the 6th Burma Rifles, commanded by Major Tin Mg (Myat Htun).  Khen Za Moong was ordered to contact the headquarters of the 3rd Chin Rifles at Meiktila and with the combined force at Thazi to clear the Meiktila-Thazi area of the K.N.D.O. and other insurgents.  Khen Za Moong flew to Heho in an Oxford aircraft of the Burma Air Force.  On arrival at Heho he discovered the airfield was guarded by a detachment of the newly formed 1st Shan Rifles.  Major Kyaw Nyunt of the 5th Burma Rifles was in command of the area.[11]   

Khen Za Moong organised an attack against Meiktila but despite initial success was forced to withdraw to Thazi when the K.N.D.O. counter attacked, supported by artillery, mortars and armoured cars.  He then flew to Rangoon with Major Tin Mg (Myat Htun) to report the situation at Thazi but when he returned he found that Thazi had been encircled and that he, Major Tin Mg and their small escort were unable to rejoin "SONFORCE”.  The officers joined the White P.V.O. insurgents in the area, who at that time were maintaining a temporary truce with Gorvernment forces.  Khen Za Moong maintained contact with the troops inside Thazi by radio.[12]

Major Khen Za Moong then returned to Rangoon where he was given command of the Chin Company of the 2nd Burma Rifles, led by Captain Zel Khai, and with this company flew back to Heho.  This small force attacked Thazi railway station but could advance no further.  Later they planned a second attack but at dawn on the day of the attack, 8th April 1949, scouts reported that the K.N.D.O. had left.  The 2nd Burma Rifles company entered Thazi and made contact with the troops of "SONFORCE".  The K.N.D.O. had abandoned Meiktila and Thazi and were making their way to Toungoo.[13]

The force at Thazi then made contact with the 3rd Chin Rifles headquarters in Meiktila.  The Communists and the White P.V.O. had entered Meiktila and were in the process of occupying parts of the town.  The Government troops from Thazi, now reinforced by the Chin Company of the 2nd Burma Rifles, cleared the insurgents from the area.  After making arrangements for the garrison and administration of Thazi and Meiktila, "SONFORCE" was disbanded and the various detachments of troops rejoined their parent units.[14]

The Karen Conflict: The Battle of Pegu

On the Pegu front in April, a Karen and Kachin column of around 2,000 men set off from Toungoo for Rangoon.  The column was delayed at Nyaunglebin for three days by the fierce resistance of the 2nd Burma Rifles.  Nyaunglebin fell on 20th April and the Karens resumed their march on Rangoon, taking Daik-U two days later.  They were halted at Pegu on 1st May 1949 by a force made up of a company from each of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Burma Rifles together with two battalions of the U.M.P.  The rebels were forced to retreat to Toungoo which became the new headquarters of the K.N.D.O.[15]

Pegu District was now a major battleground and the ensuing fighting became the most crucial of the Karen-Burmese war.  If the Karens had broken through the Pegu line and reached Insein, the Rangoon Government would have fallen to the K.N.D.O.  The fierce fighting is described by Colonel Bo Kyaw Zaw;[16]

 The enemy forces attacking Daik-U were nearly a thousand strong and well-armed and fully-equipped.  Our troops in the town were one company from our 6th Burma Rifles, a U.M.P. battalion headed by Major Aye Ngwe, and a Sitwundan battalion led by Major Wai Lin.  This combined force was under the command of Major Maung Aye.

I arrived there with one company from our Sixth, two companies from the 3rd Burma Rifles led by Lt. Colonel Chit Myaing, and one Gurkha company from 4th Infantry Battalion [The 4th Battalion, The Burma Regiment].  And we positioned our forces on the Highway at the South of Daik-U.  Our plan that night was to hold the town and at dawn we would counter-attack the enemy from the left.

But just before dawn at four in the morning the Karens pushed heavily into the town and the troops couldn’t stand there anymore and had to withdraw.  Once the front line was broken we at the back had to retreat too and Daik-U fell at dawn.  The date was 24th April 1949.  We pulled back into a large village called Shanzu between Daik-U and Phaundawthi.  While Lt. Colonel Chit Myaing placed his forward command post at just south of the village I took my position at Phaungdawthi with two 25-pounder cannons.  The whole day the Karens tested our new frontline so many times just to find out our positions and strength.

That area was a major breeding and supply centre of ducks to Rangoon and since the villages were deserted the ducks were wandering all over the place.  That night we had duck curries and English brandy for our delicious dinner.  We even invited Lt. Colonel Chit Myaing and his medical officer Captain Mon Htaw.

A rare Karen officer still serving in the army, Captain Mon Htaw and I were together back in Rangoon University before the big War.  His wife Dorris and little daughter together with his mother and sister were then trapped in K.N.D.O.-controlled Toungoo and he specially requested to be here with us so that he would eventually be going to Toungoo when we marched to retake the capital of KNDO.  He was killed by the K.N.D.O. Karens during the early morning attack the next day.

After the dinner I went to bed and was woken up by the arrival of a company from the 5th Burma Rifles now fighting in the Insein battle.  They arrived in four big trucks and Colonel Kyaw Zaw had sent them to us as a rare reinforcement.  I told them to continue on the highway and report to Lt. Colonel Chit Myaing at the Command Post a thousand yards ahead.

I then went to bed and again jolted out of the bed by the loud tat-tat-tats of machine gun fire. Time was close to four in the morning.  Then we heard our Sten gun fires from the command post only about a thousand yards away.  When we tried to call them by telephone the contact was suddenly lost as if the enemy had cut the wire.  The enemy was already between us and the Command Post and I had no infantry to protect the artillery.  So I ordered the 6-pounders to retreat to Letkhokekwin Village down south.

Amidst the dazzling rain in the early dawn darkness I then saw a small group slowly walking towards us.  They were Lt. Colonel Chit Myaing and four or five men.  They then told me that Captain Mon Htaw and most of our troops had fallen.  Lt. Colonel Chit Myaing also told me what happened exactly that morning [28th April 1949].

The company sent from the 5th Burma Rifles at Insein was placed as the reserve to the rear of the Command Post to take a decent rest since they were tired from the long journey and the tough battles back in Insein.  At 03:30 in the morning Karens started attacking the front line with just a small force while they sent their main force around our rear.  They overcame the reserve company with machine gun fire and quickly wiped them out by a brutal bayonet charge.  The Command Post with headquarters platoon and mortar platoon were lost in a short time.  More than 100 men including Captain Mon Htaw, 2nd Lt. Saw Lwin, and 2nd Lt. Ko Ko Lay were killed there and Karens had executed all the wounded.

The government forces suffered around 100 casualties, almost entirely from the 3rd Burma Rifles.   Later a memorial pagoda for the fallen was built at the site near Shanzu Village.  Private Hla Thaung was one of those killed while covering the retreat of his comrades.  He was awarded Aung-San-Thuria medal, the highest honour for bravery in Burma.  The Army later established a cadet regiment in his name at Mingaladon to train and educate the miscreant sons of army officers. 

The strength of the government force defending Pegu was now two companies of the 3rd Burma Rifles, two companies of 6th Burma Rifles, a Gurkha company of the 4th Burma Regiment, some men of the U.M.P., an old tank, and a platoon of two 6-pounder anti-tank guns.  Lt. Colonel Chit Myaing set up a defensive position once more at Phayagyi village and Myat Htan placed his two 6-pounders at Letkhokekwin village, further to the South.  Lt. Colonel Chit Myaing and Major Tin Maung (Myat Htan), the latter being second-in-command of the 6th Burma Rifles, were commander and second in command respectively.  Major Myat Htan wrote of the aftermath of the fighting around Pegu;[17]

The battle of Pegu was over that day. We found 97 enemy corpses inside the village and captured over 100 of their Brens, Stens, and rifles. In the bottlebrush-bushes east of the village by the railway line the Karen corpse were so numerous we couldn’t even count. The K.N.D.O.’s back was broken there and our 6th and 3rd Burma Rifles were soon relieved by the 3rd Chin Battalion from Insein as the battle there was also nearly over.

A defensive position was taken up in the defile by the Moyingyi reservoir which was then attacked by the Karens on 30th April.  Despite some success in outflanking the government forces, losses forced the Karens to withdraw to Kadok Payagyi where they went on to the defensive.[18]

The Karen Conflict: Finale at Pegu

In the first week of June 1949, given reports that 3,000 Karen and Kachin insurgents under Naw Seng were assembling for a fresh attack on Rangoon, General Ne Win flew to Meiktila.  Here he met the commanders of the 3rd Chin Rifles and the 6th Burma Rifles, Lt. Colonels Lian Cin Zam and Tin U respectively.  Lt. Colonel Tin U was ordered to place his two companies under the command of the 3rd Chin Rifles and the combined force under Lt. Colonel Lian Cin Ziam was flown from Meiktila to Mingaladon during the second week of June.  From Mingaladon the troops were taken to the Daik-U area by truck where they came under the command of Brigadier General Kyaw Zaw, commander of the South Burma Area.  The insurgents attacked day and night and hand-to-hand fighting was common.  The government troops suffered such heavy casualties that several companies were reduced to little more than single platoons.  However in mid-July the Karens and their allies were defeated and forced to withdraw.  The 3rd Chin Rifles captured Daik-U.  Government casualties amounted to 255 men killed and wounded.[19]

Elsewhere in June another company of the 6th Burma Rifles was involved in the recapture and subsequent defence of the oilfields.  This important area around Chauk and Yenangyaung had been taken by the P.V.O. at the end of February 1949.  By June however the P.V.O. had taken many casualties at Meiktila and become quite demoralised.  They suffered still further from the fighting that occurred between themselves and the Communists in the oilfields area.  On 9th June troops of the Kachin Rifles inflicted a further defeat on the insurgents in the area and they began to withdraw from Chauk and Yenangyaung to the area of Minbu.  Yenangyaung and Chauk were re-occupied by government forces on 19th and 11th June respectively, re-establishing government control of the oilfields.  It was these actions that were supported by the company of the 6th Burma Rifles.[20]

The Karen Conflict: Battle of Sarbutoun

Fighting to clear the last insurgents in the Pegu District continued up until the end of 1949.  Major Myat Htan wrote of the final battle in the District, at the village of Sarbutoun, near Hlegu, in his autobiography;

Led by Col. Kyaw Zaw the operation had 1st Infantry Battalion led by Lt. Col Sein Win, 3rd Burma Rifles led by Lt. Col Chit Myaing and my 6th Burma Rifles. My 6th would lead the first attack and the 3rd and 1st Infantry would continually attack alternatively.

On 18th December 1949 we left Hlegu at sunrise towards Sarbutoun in a long line of tanks, armoured-carriers and the infantry on a narrow unsealed-dirt road. At about 400 yards from the K.N.D.O. first defence line they fired heavily on us. As planned we spread the carriers onto the fields.

To our surprise the chain carriers immediately sunk into the mud. The fields beside the road were dried as rock yesterday but the Karens had diverted the water from the small creek nearby onto the fields last night. With chained-carriers being stuck in the mud and the infantry in the middle of Pangee fields under enemy’s heavy fire I was forced to change our plan.

I jumped down into the roadside-ditch and crawled up to the front and reached my troops stuck in the mud. Immediately I was told Lt. Hla Shwe was killed. He was formerly a very good sergeant from my battalion and was selected for the OTS (Officer Training School). He had just finished from OTS and been assigned into his old battalion again as an officer. Now he was dead in his first battle as an officer and I felt extremely bad.

I was forced to move the spearhead of attack to our right and defeated the enemy completely by the heavy support fire from our tanks and armoured-carriers. After my battalion’s assault the 1st and 3rd Burma Rifles kept the pressure on the enemy and that evening the K.N.D.O. had to abandon Sarbutoun village known among us as the K.N.D.O. Fortress.

We had cleared all the K.N.D.O. forces between Rangoon and Pegu.  Apart from Toungoo all other major towns in the country were now retaken by the army and the Rangoon Government is back in business as the Government of Union of Burma.

The Karen Conflict: The Recapture of Toungoo - the Battle for Pyuntaza

In February 1950 a large scale operation called Operation “Thunder” was mounted to retake Toungoo, the K.N.D.O. “capital”.  The operation was led by Brigadier General Kyaw Zaw.  Under his command were the regular infantry battalions of the 1st and 3rd Chin Rifles, the 3rd and 6th Burma Rifles and the recently raised 5th Infantry Battalion.  There were also two battalions of Union Military Police.  This force was supported by a detachment of 25-pounder field guns, a tank force comprising a Sherman, two Stuarts, and assorted Bren Carriers (all assembled from scrapped vehicles abandoned by the British), engineer and supply troops.[21]

The attack force gathered at Daik-U and on 18th February marched north towards Toungoo.  Blocking the way was a large and well equipped K.N.D.O. force entrenched at Pyuntaza.  The K.N.D.O. were supported by heavy weaponry including tanks, an armoured-train and 6-pounder anti-tank guns.  Major Myat Htan, in command of the 6th Burma Rifles, was present at the battle for Pyuntaza which he described in his autobiography;[22]

The heavy weapons of the K.N.D.O. in Pyuntaza were not that serious a problem for us as we could have captured the town eventually. But we wanted to capture their heavy weaponry since if they escaped from Pyuntaza we would have to face them again and again at next steps of K.N.D.O. defence along all the way to Toungoo.

To capture them we needed to block their escape route by attacking from their rear and blocking both the highway and railway between Pyuntaza and Nyaunglebin to the north of Pyuntaza.  This task was given to my 6th Burma Rifles.  For the operation my battalion had to practice for many days.  We trained the troops for night march, compass use, and defence positions.  We even found a similar ground as the target and trained the troops for many possible situations there.  Finally at dusk on 24th February all our four companies left Daik-U for Pyuntaza.  To my satisfaction the long line of 500 odd men hardly made any noise in the dark silence.

We marched north, crossed a wide stream, and reached directly west of the town. A company was left there in the paddy fields and my H.Q. and a company continued onto village of Aye, northwest of the town, and reached there just before 03:00 in the morning.  The two companies at the point of the column then turned east towards the town.  One of the two went to the highway and railway and positioned itself there and the other took a blocking position to the east of town. The blocking of K.N.D.O. exits on the west, north, and east was completed well before dawn.

At Aye village we blocked around the village and took the positions facing the town.  At 04:30 we heard the artillery from Daik-U and then the starting sounds of our tanks and carriers. Operation “Thunder” had begun.  As the day was breaking more and more gun fire could be heard from the town.

At day-break we heard and then saw the K.N.D.O. armoured-train coming out of Pyuntaza Station.  The train was obviously running away to Nyaunglebin.  Then we heard the loud noise of an explosion and saw the train abruptly stopped just before the railway bridge at north of the town.  Our company there had blown up the bridge and captured the trapped train.

By then more and more gun fire could be heard from around the town and then right from inside the town.  The enemy was resisting fiercely at first but their gun fire was slowly fading away as they started withdrawing from the town.  As expected we saw at least 40 to 50 men retreating towards us at the village of Aye.  The retreating Karens were completely exposed in the open fields under the rising sun.  Once they were within our range we fired warning shots and called out to them to surrender but they refused and fired back at us.  As we had no other alternatives we fired at them and within a short five minutes all of them were killed.  Their corpses piled up on the blood-soaked ground of paddy fields.

At midday we entered the town and met up with Bogyoke Kyaw Zaw in the northern part of town. The K.N.D.O. was hit hard there and we captured all their heavy weaponry. The next day [26th February] my 6th Burma Rifles entered Nyaunglebin and found no K.N.D.O. resistance as the enemy had withdrawn from the town.”

The operation began unexpectedly well, taking the Government forces by surprise and finding them unprepared to exploit it.  After the action at Pyuntaza, at Pyu the Karens made a tactical error by being drawn by a feint attack which left open a heavily defended and well prepared position which fell easily to Government troops.  From then on only token resistance was put up by the Karens and the operation proceeded on the by now standard one or two company basis against very slight opposition.  Although the Government claimed to have inflicted very high casualties on the K.N.D.O., their own casualties were very light, only one officer killed and six other ranks wounded.  However the K.N.D.O. did lose heavily in terms of weapons and equipment.[23] 

The 6th Burma Rifles were rested for the remainder of Operation “Thunder” and the Battalion was given the task of maintaining the rear security and line of communication of the government column as it advanced to Toungoo.  During this time, Major Myat Htan was also able to supervise the intensive training of the newly-formed 5th Infantry Battalion at Pegu Airfield.  Toungoo was captured on 19th March 1950, thereby the government forces regained control of most of the important centres on the Rangoon-Mandalay railway, although the line itself was inoperable due to the destruction of track, bridges and signals.[24]

After the loss of Toungoo the Karens withdrew, possibly across the Sittang into the hills to the east and north east although it was rumoured some may have crossed the Pegu Yomas attempting to reach their fellows in the Delta via Prome.  On 31st March Pyinmana was entered without resistance from the B.C.P. insurgents.[25]

19 November 2017

[1] Epilogue in Burma, 1945-48”, McEnery J.M., Spellmount (1990); “Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948”

[2] “Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948”, Maung Aung Myoe, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (2009).

[3] Review of the Situation in Burma, 30th September 1948, DEFE 7/863; The Third Quarterly Report of the British Services Mission,30th September 1948, DEFE 7/863; “Review of the Situation in Burma”, British Services Mission, 30th June 1948, DEFE 7/863

[4] “Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948”, Bertil Lintner; “General Ne Win: A Political Biography”, Taylor R., Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, (2015).

[5] Burma in Revolt

[6]Review of the Civil War in Burma”, British Services Mission, 21st March 1949, DEFE 7/864

[7] “The Chin Hills Battalion”, MSS Eur 250; Guide to Intra-state Wars; Bo Kyaw Zaw’s autobiography; The Union of Burma”, 4th edn., Tinker H., OUP (1962).

[8] After the re-conquest of Burma a Frontier Constabulary was created to take on the security problems of Burma’s borders which before the war had been the responsibility of the Burma Frontier Force.  The place of the Burma Military Police was taken by a new force called the Armed Police.  After independence on 4th January 1948, this force became the Union Military Police (U.M.P.)  (“Law, Society and Transition in Myanmar”, Crouch M., Lindsey T. Bloomsbury (2014)).

[9] Myat Htan’s autobiography, extracts published in “Burma in Limbo”.

[10] Myat Htan’s autobiography

[11] "Tedim to Yangon, Background and Record of The Moong Family",  Khen Za Moong, (1995)

[12] Tedim to Yangon

[13] Tedim to Yangon; “The Chin Hills Battalion”, MSS Eur 250.

[14] Tedim to Yangon

[15] Guide to Intra-state Wars; Bo Kyaw Zaw’s autobiography; Tinker

[16] This translated extract (edited) is from Bo Kyaw Zaw’s autobiography on the C.P.B. website and made available in a series of posts at Hla Oo’s Blog under the title “Burma in Limbo” (Hla Oo's Blog).

[17] Myat Htan’s autobiography

[18] The Second Quarterly Report of the British Services Mission, 30th June 1949, DEFE 7/865

[19] The Outbreak of the K.N.D.O. and M.N.D.O.; MSS Eur 250

[20] Second Quarterly Report, 30th June 1949, DEFE 7/865

[21] Myat Htan’s autobiography; Tinker; The First Quarterly Report of the British Services Mission, 31st March 1950, DEFE 7/866

[22] Myat Htan’s autobiography

[23] First Quarterly Report 1950, DEFE 7/865

[24] Myat Htan’s autobiography; Tinker

[25] First Quarterly Report 1950, DEFE 7/865